On July 12, a large meeting was convened in Paris. All European countries were invited, with the exception of Spain (a neutral world war II country that had sympathized with the Axis powers) and the small states of Andorra, San Marino, Monaco and Liechtenstein. The Soviet Union was invited with the understanding that it would probably refuse. The states of the future Eastern bloc were also discussed, and Czechoslovakia and Poland agreed to participate. In one of the clearest signs and reflections of strict Soviet control and domination over the region, Jan Masaryk, Czechoslovakia`s foreign minister, was summoned to Moscow and insulted by Stalin for considering Czechoslovakia`s possible participation in the Marshall Plan and its adherence to the Marshall Plan. Polish Prime Minister Józef Cyrankiewicz was rewarded by Stalin for his country`s rejection of the plan, which took the form of the Soviet Union`s offer for a lucrative five-year trade deal, a grant of about $450 million (1948; the sum would have been $4.4 billion in 2014[54]) in the form of loans and long-term loans, and the provision of $200,000. Tons of grain, heavy machinery and production and factories and heavy industry in Poland. [55] Germany, which until the 1953 debt agreement had to assume that all Marshall Plan aid had to be repaid, spent its funds very carefully. The payment of Marshall Plan assets, “counterpart funds,” was managed by the Reconstruction Credit Institute, which used the funds for loans in Germany. In the 1953 debt agreement, the amount of Marshall Plan aid that Germany had to repay was reduced to less than $1 billion. [108] Thus, the share of loans to Germany relative to grants to Germany was similar to that of France and the United Kingdom. [107] The final repayment of the German loan took place in 1971.
[109] Since Germany decided to repay the aid debts of the German federal budget and leave the German ERP fund intact, the fund was able to continue its reconstruction work. By 1996 it had accumulated a value of DM 23 billion. [110] On the way to a useful response to Europe`s problems, three main obstacles had to be overcome. On the one hand, as Foreign Minister Marshall`s invitation showed, the European nations that acted together had to agree on a plan. Second, the administration and Congress had to reach their own agreement on a legislative agenda. After all, the resulting plan was to be one that, in Marshall`s words, “would provide a cure rather than a mere palliative.” 7 The first step towards meeting the American conditions for granting additional aid to Europe was taken by the 16 nations which met in Paris from 12 July to 22 September 1947 and drew up the new European reconstruction programme to be submitted to the United States. The move was a direct response to Secretary of State Marshall`s statement at Harvard University on May 5. June that before the United States can go much further with foreign aid, “there must be an agreement between the countries of Europe on the needs of the situation and the part that these countries themselves will take in order to give the right effect to the measures taken by this government”. As required by ERP legislation, the United States has bilateral agreements with each country. These were fairly consistent – they required certain commitments to achieve the LES`s objectives, such as.
B measures to stabilise the currency and increase output, as well as commitments to provide economic information against which to assess the needs and results of the programme. However, the duration of the “official” Marshall Plan, as well as the amounts spent under the plan, are controversial. According to some, the program operated until its scheduled end date of June 30, 1952. Others date the completion of the plan about six months earlier, when its administrative official, the Economic Cooperation Agency (ECA), ended and its recovery programs were harmonized with those of the new Mutual Security Agency (a process that began in the second half of 1951). According to the agreements with the USSR, the shipment of dismantled German industrial facilities from the West began on March 31, 1946. Under the terms of the agreement, the Soviet Union would in return ship raw materials such as food and timber to western areas. In the face of Soviet failure, the western areas stopped deliveries to the east, ostensibly temporarily, although they were never resumed. Later, it turned out that the main reason for stopping deliveries to the East was not the behavior of the USSR, but the recalcitrant behavior of France. [122] Examples of material received by the USSR were the equipment of the Kugel-Fischer ball carrier plant in Schweinfurt, the Daimler-Benz underground aircraft engine plant in Obrigheim, the Deschimag shipyards in Bremen-Weser, and the Gendorf power plant. [123] [124] The CEECs did not make their proposal without the participation of the United States.
Their draft proposal reflected the major differences between nations in their approach to trade liberalization, Germany`s role, and state control over economies. Because of these differences, the United States feared that the CEECs` proposal would be little more than a list of needs without a coherent program to generate long-term growth. To avoid such a situation, the State Department linked its adoption of the European program to the approval of the participants, but while it struggled with deeply felt sensitivities regarding European sovereignty, the influence of the United States on European economic and social decision-making was reduced as a direct result of support for the European Economic Recovery Plan. Where it controlled matching funds intended for use in capital projects, American influence was considerable. When counterparty funds were simply used to reduce debt to support financial stability, there was little influence. Some analysts suspect that the US had minimal control over European domestic politics because its aid was small compared to the total resources of European countries. But while there was little it could do to get Europe to give up exchange rate controls, the United States, according to many, was able to make changes on less sensitive issues.35 On some occasions, the Court threatened sanctions if participating countries did not respect their bilateral agreements. Italy was threatened with losing its aid because it did not act to adopt the recommended programmes, and in April 1950 Greece was deprived of aid in order to force appropriate internal measures.36 A European body, the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), was set up in agreement with the participating countries in order to preserve the “common” character on which the programme was established. and strengthen the sense of mutual accountability for its success. Previously, participating countries had jointly committed to certain commitments (see above). The OEEC should be the instrument that should guide members in meeting their multilateral commitments. Speech at Harvard University, June 5, 1947, 284 in Joseph M.
Jones, The Fifteen Weeks. Jones` book provides a detailed description of the events that led to this discourse. Full references to the book can be found in the appendix. For the sound and transcript of Marshall`s speech, visit the Marshall Foundation website in marshallfoundation.org/. In 1947, the Soviet Union introduced a plan to help its allies in Eastern Europe. They called this plan the Molotov plan. Within the framework of the Molotov Plan, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) was created, a system of bilateral trade agreements and an economic alliance between the socialist countries of the Eastern bloc. As a collective of European nations, the OEEC has created peer pressure that has encouraged individual nations to live up to their Marshall Plan commitments. The OEEC provided a forum for the discussion and possible negotiation of agreements conducive to intra-European trade. For Europeans, its existence made the plan less like an American program.
In line with the American desire to promote European integration, the OEEC helped to create the “European idea”. As West German Vice-Chancellor Blucher noted, “the OEEC had at least one important element. European men got together, knew each other and were ready to work together. 37 The Court has provided financial support for efforts to promote European integration (see below) and, above all, has provided the OEEC with a certain amount of financial leverage of its own. By asking the OEEC to assume some responsibility for the allocation of US aid among participating countries, ECA has elevated the organization to a higher status than it would otherwise have done, thus facilitating the achievement of the objectives of the Marshall Plan. .